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ing of the jurors is infected by unnecessary and detrimental impressions. It would be better if nothing was introduced into the trial that
24
suggests to a jury that its verdict is inconclusive.
PETER JOHN DAUK

DETERMINATION

OF ACTUAL CASH VALUE

FOR INSURANCE PURPOSES
The recent federal case of Harper v. Penn Mut. Fire Ins. Co.' deals

with the problem of determining the actual cash value of a building
under a policy of insurance covering damage by windstorm. The pol2
icy contained an 8o per cent co-insurance clause, so that the insurer
was interested in establishing a high actual cash value, so as to bring
the co-insurance clause into operation, and the insured wanted to establish a lower value for the property. The insurer urged adoption of

the theory of replacement cost less depreciation while the insured,
in all probability, argued for the adoption of the broad evidence
rule.
In the absence of a controlling Virginia decision, the court used the
broad evidence rule to determine actual cash value. The broad evidence rule permits the introduction and consideration of any evidence
"People v. Esposito, supra note 17.
l199 F. Supp. 663 (E.D. Va. 1961).
The purpose of the co-insurance clause is to compel the insured to carry
an amount of insurance at least equal to a specified percentage (usually 80%) of
the value of the property by requiring him to bear part of any loss incurred if he
fails to do so. For example, assume that an insured has a policy for $5o,000, with
an 8o% co-insurance clause. The actual cash value of his property is $ioo,ooo, and
he suffers a loss of $40,000. The amount of insurance required by the co-insurance
clause is $8oooo. Since the insured is only carrying five-eighths of the required
amount, the insurer will be liable for only five-eighths of the $40,000 loss (S25,ooo)
and the insured will have to bear the remainder of the loss ($15,oo). See Pearl
Assur. Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 239 Ala. 515, 195 So. 747 (194o); Buse v.
National Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 96 Misc. 229, 16o N.Y. Supp. 566 (Sup. Ct. 196).
The co-insurance provision, from its very nature, can only take effect where the
loss is partial. Templeton v. Insurance Co. of North America, 2o S.W.2d 784
(Mo. Ct. App. 1947). Where, for example, the amount of insurance equals the
specific percentage of the actual cash value of the property at the time of the loss
or where the loss is total, the insured will recover in full, but not in excess of the
amount of the policy. Hence, by the terms of the co-insurance clause, the liability
of the insurer may vary with changes in the value of the property. For a discussion
of the background and function of co-insurance, see Templeton v. Insurance Co. of
North America, 201 SAV.d 784 (Mo. Ct. App. 1947); Aldrich v. Great Am. Ins.
Co., 195 App. Div. 174, 186 N.Y. Supp. 569 (1st Dep't 1921).
2
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logically' tending to the formation of a correct estimate of the value
3
of the property at the time of the loss.

Actual cash value is a term susceptible of various interpretations.
The courts have said there is no single criterion applicable to all cases. 4
Generally, actual cash value depends on the nature of the property
insured, its condition, and other circumstances existing at the time
of the loss. 5 With respect to buildings, however, the courts have developed three general criteria or tests. 6 They are: (i) market value,
(2) replacement or reproduction cost less depreciation, and (3)the socalled broad evidence rule.
One view is that actual cash value means the market value of the
property at the time of the loss. The court in Butler v. Aetna Ins. Co.,7
which involved the loss of a grain elevator, said that actual cash value
means the market price of the property at the time of the loss "and
where there is no established market the market price must be estimated at such amount as in all probability would have been arrived
at by fair negotiations between an owner willing to sell and a purchaser
desiring to buy, taking into account all considerations that fairly might
be brought forward and reasonably given substantial weight in such
bargaining."8 The difficulty with this view9 is that the value of a
building is often dependent upon the marketability of the land on
which the building is situated. If there is little market demand for
the land, the building will also have a lower market value. 10 Buildings
are not ordinarily bought and sold in the market separately from the
land and- so do not have a market value apart from the land, in the
strict sense of the term."' For example, one might have an insured
'Harper v. Penn Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 199 F. Supp. 663 (E.D. Va. 1961).
'See, e.g., Canadian Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Colonsay Hotel, [19231 3 D.L.R. 1ooi
(Can. Sup. Ct.). The trial court in this case had ruled that the test of actual cash
value was replacement cost less depreciation. This was unanimously reversed on
appeal, on three different grounds.
Featherston v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 146 F. Supp. 535 (W.D. Ark. 1956);
Castoldi v. Hartford County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 21 Conn. Supp. 265, 154 A.2d 247
(Super. Ct. 1959); Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. Martineau, 26 Tenn. App. 261, 170 SAV.2d
927 (1943).

lAnnot., 61 A.L.R.2d 711 (1958).
164 N.D. 764, 256 N.W. 214 (1934).
"256 N.W. at 215.
OIt would appear that in cases where there is no established market this test
would result in substantially the same actual cash value as derived through the
use of the so-called broad evidence rule.
""See, e.g., State Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 14 Colo. 499, 24 Pac. 333 (189o); Britven
v.
Occidental Ins. Co., 234 Iowa 682, 13 N.W.2d 791 (1944).
"Kingsley v. Spofford, 298 Mass. 469, 11 N.E.2d 487 (1937); McAnarney v.
Newark Fire Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 176, 159 N.E. 902 (1928).
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building of the value of $ioo,ooo in an undesirable location. And if
there was little demand for land in that location, the building might
not be sold at all; yet, the building might still be worth $loo,ooo to
the owner for business purposes. Hence, most courts reject market
value as the sole test for determining actual cash value, but allow it
12
to be considered along with other evidence.
Another test adopted by a number of courts is replacement or reproduction cost less depreciation. 13 it would appear that in most cases
the cost of a new building of the same material and dimensions as
the one destroyed, less the amount the destroyed building has depreciated through use is readily ascertainable. By applying this test
one can estimate with reasonable accuracy the actual cash value of a
structure. The main objection to this test, however, is its inflexibility
where a structure has become obsolete. 14 For example, in McAnarney v. Newark Fire Ins. Co.,15 the insured owned a brewery which
was no longer economically useful for producing malt because of the
passage of the National Prohibition Act. The court rejected as the
sole measure of damage the cost of reproduction less physical depreciation. 16 Clearly, in such a case, if the building could no longer be
used for producing malt, its value to the owner would be considerably
lessened and the exclusive use of the reproduction cost less physical
depreciation may well result in the determination of an excessive total
actual cash value.
The tendency on the part of a substantial number of courts has
been to adopt what is termed the broad evidence rule.17 The main fac22State Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 14 Colo. 499, 24 Pac. 333 (189); Castoldi v. Hartford
County Mut. Fire Ins. CO., 21 Conn. Supp. 265, 154 A.2d 247 (Super. Ct. 1959); Smith
v. Aflemannia Fire Ins. CO., 219 Il. App. 506 (192o); Britven v. Occidental Ins. Co.,
234 Iowa 68z, 13 N.V.2d 791 (1944); Kingsley v. Spofford, 298 Mass. 469, 11 N.E.2d
487 (1937); McAnarney v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 176, 159 N.E. 902 (1928);
Third Nat'l Bank v. American Equitable Ins. Co., 27 Tenn. App. 249, 178 S.W.2d
915 (1943).
1

Knuppel v. American Ins. Co., 269 F.2d 163 ( 7 th Cir. 1959); Svea Fire & Life
Ins. Co. v. State Say. & Loan Ass'n, i9 F.9d 134 (8th Cir. 1927); Boise Ass'n of Credit
Men v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 44 Idaho 249, 256 Pac. 523 (1927); Smith v. Allemannia Fire Ins. CO., 219 Ill. App. 506 (1920).

"See 37 Yale L.J. 827 (1928).
Ug47 N.Y. 176, 159 N.E. 9o2 (1928).
Ui59 N.E. at 9o4.
1T

Britven v. Occidental Ins. Co., 234 Iowa 682, 13 N.W.2d 791 (1944); Eshan
Realty Corp. v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 25 Misc. 2d 828, 2o. N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct.
196o); Gervant v. New England Fire Ins. Co., 3o6 N.Y. 393, 118 N.E.2d 574 1954);
Sebring v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 227 App. Div. 103, 237 N.Y.S. 12o (4 th Dep't 1929);
McAnarney v. 'Newark Fire Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 176, 159 N.E. 9o2 (1928); Rochester
Am. Ins. Co. v. Short, 207 Okla. 669, 252 P.2d 490 (1953); Citizens' Say. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Fitchburg Mut. Fire Ins. CO., 86 Vt. 267, 84 Ad. 970 (1912).
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tors to be considered under this rule in determining actual cash
value were pointed out in the leading case of McAnarney v. Newark
Fire Ins. Co.18 The court said:
"Where insured buildings have been destroyed, the trier of fact
may, and should, call to its aid, in order to effectuate complete
indemnity, every fact and circumstance which would logically
tend to the formation of a correct estimate of the loss. It may
consider original cost and cost of reproduction; the opinions
upon value given by qualified witnesses; the declarations against
interest which may have been made by the assured; the gainful
uses to which the buildings might have been put; as well as
any other fact reasonably tending to throw light upon the
subject."' 9
Factors such as rental values or income, expenses in connection with
the operation of a building, and the valuation placed upon the
building by public listers have been held admissible as bearing upon
the question of actual cash value. 20 In the case of a destroyed dwelling
house, the jury was sent to the neighborhood in which the residence was
located with the instruction to view the entire neighborhood with
regard to its character as a consideration affecting the value of the
2
property. '
. A modem application of the broad evidence rule is illustrated in
the case of Thorp v. American Aviation & Gen. Ins. Co., 22 in which
the actual cash value of a motion picture theatre was in issue. The
trial judge, in addition to instructing the jury to consider the factors
set forth in -the McAnarney case,23 also advised the jury to consider that
during the building's entire existence as a theater it had lost money in
its operation, despite good management; that it was affected by a
water condition which wet the theater and its contents; that there
was no sewerage system in town; that the effective drawing power
of the theater was limited to a three or four mile radius; that the
average daily receipts for six weeks prior to the fire were less than
$45.00; that some sixty-six theaters in the area had been closed down,
abandoned, or converted to other uses in the period shortly before and
subsequent to the date of the trial; that the theater had no air-conditioning; and that the increase in the distribution of television sets
"247 N.Y. 176, 159 N.E. 9o2 (1928).
"159 N.E. at 9o5.
"Citizens' Say. Bank & Trust Co. v. Fitchburg Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 86 Vt. 267,
84 Ad. 970 (1912).
2
Rochester Am. Ins. Co. v. Short, 207 Okla. 669, 252 P.2d 490, 492 (1953).
0212 F.2d 821 (3d Cir. 1954).
2247 N.Y. 176, 159 N.E. 9o2 (1928).

